The Declaration of Helsinki and the CHRB.
The Declaration of Helsinki built on the principles for ethical conduct of medical experiments on humans that were laid down following the judgments at the Nuremburg Trials for Nazi war criminals, some of whom were doctors who had performed a range of horrific acts on humans in the name of medical experimentation. 7 Principles 24 and 26 of the Declaration are central to the standard of protection of the incapable in research. Principle 24 states that:
"For a research subject who is legally incompetent, physically or mentally incapable of giving consent or is a legally incompetent minor, the investigator must obtain informed consent from the legally authorized representative in accordance with applicable law. These groups should not be included in research unless the research is necessary to promote the health of the population represented and this research cannot instead be performed on legally competent persons."
Principle 26 adds that:
"Research on individuals from whom it is not possible to obtain consent, including proxy or advance consent, should be done only if the physical/mental condition that prevents obtaining informed consent is a necessary characteristic of the research population. The specific reasons for involving research subjects with a condition that renders them unable to give informed consent should be stated in the experimental protocol for consideration and approval of the review committee. The protocol should state that consent to remain in the research should be obtained as soon as possible from the individual or a legally authorized surrogate."
Whilst both principles are couched in restrictive terms, their effect is to allow some research that 4 Ibid. See also Butler-Sloss LJ in St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26, 48. 5 Adopted by the 18th World Medical Association (WMA) General Assembly, Helsinki, Finland, June 1964, and amended most recently by 52nd WMA General Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland, October 2000. 6 
See further Zilgalvis, P, 'The European Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine: Its Past, A, Lewis, T, Tingle, J (eds.) , Healthcare Law: The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 , Cavendish, 2001 . 7 See Katz, J, Experimentation with Human Beings, 1972 is incompatible with the interests of the incapable person. Admittedly, principle 24 talks about the need for the research to be necessary to promote health but this is a reference to the health of the population. This means, for example, that research could be performed on an incapable sufferer of Alzheimer's disease where it was necessary to promote the health of Alzheimer's sufferers taken as a whole even if it did not benefit the individual sufferer, let alone have benefits that were sufficient to justify it as the optimal choice in terms of his or her interests.
The substantive requirement in the first sentence of Principle 26 may indirectly temper this problem but it does not solve it. However, there are at least two sound reasons why the deviation from best interests envisaged in these principles should not be given effect to. Firstly the Declaration specifically protects the primacy of the individual -Principle 5 stating that '(i)n medical research on human subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subject should take precedence over the interests of science and society'. Secondly, ii. the results of the research have the potential to produce real and direct benefit;
iii. research of comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out on individuals capable of giving consent;
iv. the necessary authorisation provided for under Article 6 has been given specifically and in writing; and v. the person concerned does not object.
2. Exceptionally and under protective conditions prescribed by law, where the research has not the potential to produce results of direct benefit to the health of the person concerned, such research may be authorised subject to the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs i, iii, iv and v above, and to the following additional conditions: i. the research has the aim of contributing, through significant improvement in the scientific understanding of the individual's condition, disease or disorder, to the ultimate attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to the person concerned or to other persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same disease or disorder or having the same condition;
ii. the research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden for the individual concerned."
Article 17(2)(i) is the key provision here because it makes it clear that the research does not have to be aimed at (or presumably have the prospect of resulting in) benefit to its subjects if it has a benefit to other persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same disease or disorder or having the same condition. In other words there are circumstances in which the incapable can be subject to research that is not in their interests, even some that will not convey any benefit on them whatsoever. This is hard to reconcile with Article 2 which states that in interventions on humans in the fields of medicine and biology,
"(t)he interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science."
What is more, the fact that Article 17 targets the incapable for lesser treatments makes it hard to reconcile with Article 1 which requires signatories to,
"guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine."
How should these internal inconsistencies be dealt with? Article 17, as a specific issue provision, could be read down in the light of Articles 1 and 2 which convey overarching norms. After all, as Zilgalvis notes, the aim of the Convention is 'to protect human rights and dignity and all its articles must be interpreted in this light.' 9 However, the presence of Article 26 complicates the issue. It stipulates that: "1. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of the rights and protective provisions contained in this Convention other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of public health or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
2. The restrictions contemplated in the preceding paragraph may not be placed on Articles 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21." Expressed in the permissive rather than the negative, it is evident that the purpose of this Article is to allow a measure of restriction of certain rights. The question that arises in the immediate context is whether that might include restricting the right to bodily security of the incapable simply to meet a need for research. Dr Elaine Gadd, former Chair of the Council of Europe Steering Committee on Bioethics (1999 Bioethics ( -2001 , has stated Article 2 'means that wherever the interests of society and those of the individual conflict, the interests of the individual should in principle take precedence.' 10 Nonetheless, Article 2 does not appear in the Article 26(2) list and hence it must be read in the light of Article 26. Commenting on the relationship between the two, Dr Gadd has emphasised that, 
"(i)t is important to distinguish the concept of society as a whole, and the fact that society is composed of individuals. Sometimes the interests of different individuals conflict and this conflict will need to be resolved." 11
It is implicit in any system recognising individual primacy that where the interests of individuals conflict, they will have to be weighed against one another and an appropriate resolution found in the light of this. Article 26 merely makes that process and the terms on which it is conducted more explicit and precise. However, in considering the scope of both Article 2 and 26 it is imperative to distinguish between rights and mere needs. Neither Article would preclude restricting protection of one person's right to bodily security where full protection of it conflicted with the rights of another person (consider, for example, a forced paternity test). However, there are a number of reasons why Article 26 should not be interpreted as allowing the right to bodily security to be diluted to protect the mere needs of others.
Firstly, such an interpretation would put Article 26 out of alignment with the very essence of the primacy principle protected in Article 2 and, where done selectively with a particular class, the equality principle protected in Article 1. Secondly, in doing so it would be contrary to the norm of pluralism that underpins democracy and thus unlikely to satisfy the Article 26 requirement of being 'necessary in a democratic society.' Thirdly, as will later be demonstrated, it would lead to the CHRB being incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Finally, it would put the CHRB out of kilter with the Additional Protocol on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research (Strasbourg 25/1/05). Article 15 of the Additional Protocol, entitled 'Protection of persons not able to consent to research,' elaborates on Article 17 of the Convention and specifically Article 15(2)(i) mirrors the sentiments of Article 17(2)(i). However, this emphasis on allowing the primacy principle to be abandoned in research on persons not able to consent conflicts with the overall tenor of the Additional Protocol. More specifically, the preamble makes it evident that the reasons for agreeing the Additional Protocol included convictions 'that biomedical research that is contrary to human dignity and human rights should never be carried out,' that 'the paramount concern' is 'the protection of the human being participating in research' and 'that particular protection shall be given to human beings who may be vulnerable in the context of research.' Furthermore, Article 3 of the Additional Protocol specifically imports the sentiments of Article 2 of the Convention into the research context by stating that,
"(t)he interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science."
In the light of these points, the only credible solution is to read down Article 17(2)(i) to the point of it protecting primacy with respect to research on the incapable. The procedures referred to include approval of the research by a Mental Incapacity Research Committee which, to paraphrase, must, amongst other things, satisfy itself that the research:
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(a) is desirable in order to provide knowledge of the causes or treatment of, or of the care of persons affected by, mental disability;
(b) has an object which cannot be effectively achieved without the participation of persons who are or may be without capacity to consent; and (c) will not expose such a person participating in the research to more than negligible risk and that what is done in relation to such a person for the purposes of the research will not be unduly invasive or restrictive and will not unduly interfere with his freedom of action or privacy. 17 These recommendations were not adopted in the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill 2002. 18 However, the notion that reform in this area was completely dead and buried was dispelled by the House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee Report on the Draft Bill. 19 The Committee took the view that the law relating to research on the incompetent adult should be codified. It was 'concerned that if research were to take place in the absence of statute or any regulation the opportunity for abuse would be greater.' 20 This concern was deeply ironic given that its proposal for a statutory approach to research was centred on abandoning best interests protection of the incapable adult. That abandonment was something that the Committee, echoing the Law Commission, tried to justify in terms that related back to incapable adults as a class: Incapacitated, Medical Research Council, 1991 and Gunn, M, et al., 'Medical Research and Incompetent Adults' (2000 ) Journal of Mental Health Law 60 at 66. 14 See, for example, Kennedy, I, Principles of Medical Law, 1998 , Oxford, para's 1340 -1345 . 15 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (Law Com No 231) (London: HMSO, 1995 The Committee subjected its support for abandoning a best interests approach to a proviso of nonexploitation:
"We are reminded that if legal mechanisms prevented or deterred research with such people, then the development of treatments and the undertaking of treatment trials for disorders such as Alzheimer's disease would be very problematic. The range of medical research involving people with incapacity was considerable. Other examples include investigating why people with Down's 13 See, particularly, Medical Research Council, The Ethical Conduct of Research on the Mentally

"When a person lacks the capacity to give consent, they should only be involved with medical research, if it is either in their best interests or if it is the only method of conducting research into their particular condition and everyone involved with the person is satisfied that this is a nonexploitative proposal which will not harm or distress the individual concerned." 22
This view fails to recognise that allowing the incapable to be utilised in interventions that are inconsistent with their interests necessarily constitutes treating them simply as a means to an end and, in this sense, must necessarily also be said to be exploitative and harmful. One could attempt to circumnavigate this problem by pointing out the benefits that might be gained for people who lack capacity as a whole if protection of them was diluted. However, this would be fatally flawed; either an intervention is in the best interests of an incapable individual, taking into account potential future benefit from advances that may be made in the field, or it is not, in which case it remains exploitative irrespective of these benefits. 23 The report also seemed to uncritically adopt a very restrictive perception of the best interests test in the research context. 24 It particularly emphasised the opinion of the Royal College of Psychiatrists that the 'common law does not provide authority' for medical research on the incompetent 'as it cannot be argued that research is necessarily in that incapacitated person's best interests.' 25 As is evident from cases authorising living organ and tissue donation by incapable adults under a best interests test, including Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Organ and Tissue Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] Fam 110, the best interests test does not in fact require an intervention to be necessarily in a person's best interests but simply that it is prospectively the best option for the incapable out of the choices available.
The Government responded by uncritically adopting the Committee's view, agreeing that the Bill 'should include provision for strictly controlled research to fill the gap that exists in the current law and the uncertainty and inequity this creates. 
